Mackie’s Argument

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Instructor Name

Art 101

19 November 2018

Mackie’s argument

The branch of philosophy that asks the question of what morality is, known as Metaethics. It asks question in mind philosophy, language philosophy, epistemology, and metaphysics. It raises questions that if ethics are true or false if there are any moral properties as right or wrong, and if there are ethical truths, then how a person can discover them ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM CSL_CITATION {"citationID":"8ZEyKq0R","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(Olson)","plainCitation":"(Olson)","noteIndex":0},"citationItems":[{"id":496,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/local/WcSf8WB9/items/2YI29WLQ"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/WcSf8WB9/items/2YI29WLQ"],"itemData":{"id":496,"type":"book","title":"How to Understand Mackie’s Argument from Queerness (I)","publisher":"Oxford University Press","source":"www.oxfordscholarship.com","abstract":"This chapter considers the argument from queerness and identifies non-naturalist moral realism as its target. A distinction is made between the argument from queerness and the queerness arguments. The first step of the argument from queerness is to identify ways in which moral properties and facts are queer; the second step is to offer debunking explanations of moral belief. Four queerness arguments are identified, concerning supervenience, knowledge, motivation, and irreducible normativity. This chapter examines the first three. The first two arguments generalize beyond the moral and the normative to more general issues in metaphysics and epistemology, or reduce to more basic worries about the queerness of non-natural properties. The third argument rests on problematic assumptions about moral facts. It is concluded that the first three queerness arguments are unconvincing.","URL":"https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701934.001.0001/acprof-9780198701934-chapter-5","ISBN":"978-0-19-177162-0","language":"en_US","author":[{"family":"Olson","given":"Jonas"}],"issued":{"date-parts":[["2014",1,23]]},"accessed":{"date-parts":[["2019",11,21]]}}}],"schema":"https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"} (Olson). According to moral realism, wrong and right are the properties of actions, and bad and good are properties of situations. Mackie begins with the shared observation that moral rules differ from one society to another; that is, there is a relative morality in societies ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM CSL_CITATION {"citationID":"q4aTb6aN","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(Olson)","plainCitation":"(Olson)","noteIndex":0},"citationItems":[{"id":496,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/local/WcSf8WB9/items/2YI29WLQ"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/WcSf8WB9/items/2YI29WLQ"],"itemData":{"id":496,"type":"book","title":"How to Understand Mackie’s Argument from Queerness (I)","publisher":"Oxford University Press","source":"www.oxfordscholarship.com","abstract":"This chapter considers the argument from queerness and identifies non-naturalist moral realism as its target. A distinction is made between the argument from queerness and the queerness arguments. The first step of the argument from queerness is to identify ways in which moral properties and facts are queer; the second step is to offer debunking explanations of moral belief. Four queerness arguments are identified, concerning supervenience, knowledge, motivation, and irreducible normativity. This chapter examines the first three. The first two arguments generalize beyond the moral and the normative to more general issues in metaphysics and epistemology, or reduce to more basic worries about the queerness of non-natural properties. The third argument rests on problematic assumptions about moral facts. It is concluded that the first three queerness arguments are unconvincing.","URL":"https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701934.001.0001/acprof-9780198701934-chapter-5","ISBN":"978-0-19-177162-0","language":"en_US","author":[{"family":"Olson","given":"Jonas"}],"issued":{"date-parts":[["2014",1,23]]},"accessed":{"date-parts":[["2019",11,21]]}}}],"schema":"https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"} (Olson). Rendering to one society, slavery is allowed under specific circumstances. Similarly, all people should be treated as equals and sometimes people should be treated according to their caste. Mackie argues that there are no objective moral facts, but the argument is indirect. ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM CSL_CITATION {"citationID":"UrxXhODh","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(Loeb)","plainCitation":"(Loeb)","noteIndex":0},"citationItems":[{"id":500,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/local/WcSf8WB9/items/5K4NJWHG"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/WcSf8WB9/items/5K4NJWHG"],"itemData":{"id":500,"type":"article-journal","title":"Moral Realism and the Argument from Disagreement","container-title":"Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition","page":"281-303","volume":"90","issue":"3","source":"JSTOR","archive":"JSTOR","ISSN":"0031-8116","author":[{"family":"Loeb","given":"D."}],"issued":{"date-parts":[["1998"]]}}}],"schema":"https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"} (Loeb) The fact that there is a moral difference between societies does not in itself show that there is anything wrong with moral realism. Societies also differed in empirical realities; for example, some thought the earth was flat, others were round, or again, some people could magically convey things by thinking against magic, etc. The fact that societies have disagreed about morality still opens the option of having objective moral truths, but some societies have held false beliefs about what is good and morally correct. When we think about the way we should understand and explain moral differences between societies is where the argument of moral realism comes. The realist must reason that diverse societies, with their dissimilar moral values ​​and practices and values, are all trying to come to reality about morality. According to the relativist, morality should be understood as a reflection of its way of life.

Mackie goes on to point out that realism can answer to the fact that there are general ethical principles shared by diverse societies. For instance, most communities prohibit theft, lying, murder, and encouraging the care of the weak. If the dispute chains the view that there is no objective moral truth, then the agreement will say there is. Mackie argues that the response to the argument of relativity is weak. At the finest, it appears only that essential moral principles are objective. Other moral judgments are tied to certain situations; for instance, "stealing is wrong" is true in some societies, but in others, it may be wrong. Mackie's assertion that any moral judgments relating to the conditions of society are not objective ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM CSL_CITATION {"citationID":"y1YPss7b","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(Ap)","plainCitation":"(Ap)","noteIndex":0},"citationItems":[{"id":495,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/local/WcSf8WB9/items/ZLULXLZB"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/WcSf8WB9/items/ZLULXLZB"],"itemData":{"id":495,"type":"post-weblog","title":"Wrestling with Philosophy : The Arguments from Queerness and Relativity (Mackie Part 2)","container-title":"Wrestling with Philosophy","URL":"http://missiontotransition.blogspot.com/2012/03/arguments-from-queerness-and-relativity.html","title-short":"Wrestling with Philosophy","author":[{"family":"Ap","given":""}],"issued":{"date-parts":[["2012",3,3]]},"accessed":{"date-parts":[["2019",11,21]]}}}],"schema":"https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"} (Ap). This misinterprets the nature of moral reality, as we can say, as well as the nature of truth. For instance, some plants grow in hot countries but not in cold countries. So "chili plants will grow well" is a relative fact - it's a fact in one country but not in another. But that does not make it less objective. Mackie offers a second argument against moral realism, which he calls an argument of "queerness" ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM CSL_CITATION {"citationID":"zPPJzk93","properties":{"formattedCitation":"({\\i{}Moral Anti-Realism > Mackie\\uc0\\u8217{}s Arguments for the Moral Error Theory (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)})","plainCitation":"(Moral Anti-Realism > Mackie’s Arguments for the Moral Error Theory (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy))","noteIndex":0},"citationItems":[{"id":494,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/local/WcSf8WB9/items/QKRBCGYB"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/WcSf8WB9/items/QKRBCGYB"],"itemData":{"id":494,"type":"webpage","title":"Moral Anti-Realism > Mackie's Arguments for the Moral Error Theory (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)","URL":"https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/moral-error-theory.html","accessed":{"date-parts":[["2019",11,21]]}}}],"schema":"https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"} (Moral Anti-Realism > Mackie’s Arguments for the Moral Error Theory (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)). The strangeness of moral characteristics and how one can know them if they do make it unreasonable to believe that there are any moral characteristics. The argument has two aspects, epistemological and metaphysical. Mackie argues that if there are moral characteristics, they must be completely diverse from anything else in the universe. His argument for this claim is based on the relationship between motivation and morality. Moral judgments motivate us - avoid actions that we think are wrong and try to do the right things. But that means, if there are moral characteristics, knowing what is wrong or right, bad or good, will be enough to motivate us to act in firm ways ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM CSL_CITATION {"citationID":"rdCvn1Od","properties":{"formattedCitation":"(Loeb)","plainCitation":"(Loeb)","noteIndex":0},"citationItems":[{"id":500,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/local/WcSf8WB9/items/5K4NJWHG"],"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/WcSf8WB9/items/5K4NJWHG"],"itemData":{"id":500,"type":"article-journal","title":"Moral Realism and the Argument from Disagreement","container-title":"Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition","page":"281-303","volume":"90","issue":"3","source":"JSTOR","archive":"JSTOR","ISSN":"0031-8116","author":[{"family":"Loeb","given":"D."}],"issued":{"date-parts":[["1998"]]}}}],"schema":"https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"} (Loeb). Mackie's argument is contingent on his understanding of what claims moral realism. In specific, he takes moral realism to be dedicated to the idea that moral properties are part of reality and independent of reason.

Work Cited

ADDIN ZOTERO_BIBL {"uncited":[],"omitted":[],"custom":[]} CSL_BIBLIOGRAPHY Ap. “Wrestling with Philosophy : The Arguments from Queerness and Relativity (Mackie Part 2).” Wrestling with Philosophy, 3 Mar. 2012, http://missiontotransition.blogspot.com/2012/03/arguments-from-queerness-and-relativity.html.

Loeb, D. “Moral Realism and the Argument from Disagreement.” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, vol. 90, no. 3, 1998, pp. 281–303. JSTOR.

Moral Anti-Realism > Mackie’s Arguments for the Moral Error Theory (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/moral-error-theory.html. Accessed 21 Nov. 2019.

Olson, Jonas. How to Understand Mackie’s Argument from Queerness (I). Oxford University Press, 2014. www.oxfordscholarship.com, https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701934.001.0001/acprof-9780198701934-chapter-5.